International Committee of the Red Cross

Acronym: ICRC

Established: 1863

Address: 19 Avenue de la paix, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland

Website: https://www.icrc.org

Stakeholder group: International and regional organisations

Established in 1863, the ICRC is an independent international humanitarian organisation headquartered in Geneva. It defends and promotes the respect of international humanitarian law (IHL) and is dedicated to protecting the lives and dignity of victims of war and to providing assistance. Along these lines, it cooperates with governments, the private sector, and other entities affected by international and internal armed conflict and violence.

Together with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and 192 individual national societies, the ICRC makes up the so-called International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

Digital activities

Digitalisation is increasingly present in the context of armed conflict and violence. On one hand, affected populations are in demand for digital tools, which humanitarian organisations need to provide in a responsible manner. On the other hand, states use cyber operations as part of warfare with humans affected by the consequences of such operations and other digital risks. To this end, humanitarian organisations also use digital tools to improve their operations. The ICRC addresses the implications of technology, which are multifold and range from data protection for humanitarian actions to the application of IHL to cyber operations in armed conflict. We host expert and intergovernmental discussions and have developed a number of (digital) tools to help improve awareness and understanding of IHL and relevant standards. The ICRC cooperates with other organisations on digital policy issues.

Digital policy issues

Artificial intelligence

The ICRC has explored the impact of AI tools in armed conflict, in particular their use by armed actors. In a document titled Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning in Armed Conflict: A Human-Centred Approach (2019, revised 2021), we argue: ‘Any new technology of warfare must be used, and must be capable of being used, in compliance with existing rules of international humanitarian law.’ The document touches on the use of AI and machine learning (ML) technologies capable of controlling physical military hardware. It argues that from a humanitarian perspective, AWS are of particular concern given that humans may not be able to control such weapons or the resulting use of force, and AI-controlled AWS would exacerbate these risks. The ICRC has urged states to adopt new international rules on AWS. The position paper also emphasises the potential for AI to exacerbate the risks to civilians and civilian infrastructure posed by cyber and information operations, as well as changing the nature of military decision-making in armed conflict. The ICRC calls for a human-centred approach to the application of AI in armed conflict that preserves human judgement and jointly with the United Nations Secretary-General, ICRC’s president is calling for establishing new prohibitions and restrictions on AWS. The question has been further explored in other reports, such as Autonomy, Artificial Intelligence, Robotics: Technical Aspects of Human Control (2019). 

Cyber operations during armed conflict

The use of cyber operations during armed conflict is a reality today and is likely to increase in future. Through bilateral confidential dialogue, expert discussions, participation in intergovernmental processes, and constant monitoring and analysis, the ICRC is raising awareness of the potential human cost of cyber operations and the application of IHL to cyber operations during armed conflict. Our efforts on this matter date back over two decades. Ever since, the ICRC has held the view that IHL limits cyber operations during armed conflict just as it limits the use of any other weapon, means and methods of warfare in an armed conflict, whether new or old.

Over the years, the ICRC has been actively involved in global policy discussions on cyber-related issues, including those held within the UN (various Groups of Governmental Experts (GGEs) and the Open-Ended Working Groups (OEWGs)). In addition, we convene regional consultations among government experts on how IHL applies to cyber operations, and global expert meetings, such as the potential human cost of cyber operations and avoiding civilian harm from military cyber operations during armed conflicts. Our legal views on how IHL applies to cyber operations during armed conflict are found in a 2019 position paper that was sent to all UN member states in the context of the different UN-mandated processes on information and communications technology (ICT) security. The ICRC explores innovative solutions, such as a digital emblem, to protect medical and humanitarian missions in cyberspace. 

Recently we have focused on non-state actors such as civilians and technological companies getting more and more involved in cyber operations. We first issued three documents. The first focuses on the growing trend of civilians at large getting involved in digital operations and the related risks. The second focuses on when might digital tech companies become targetable in war. And last and more specifically on hacking, we published a paper called 8 Rules for “Civilian Hackers” During War, and 4 Obligations for States to Restrain Them

‘Protection’ in the digital agae The ICRC deals with privacy and data protection within its mandate and context of IHL. In this Atlas, following the Digital Watch Observatory taxonomy, privacy and data protection are part of the human rights basket.

Without undermining the positive impact technology can bring in conflict, including enhancing access to life-saving information and potentially minimising collateral damage, protection work must consider the risks in the digital age. In other words, it must encompass the protection of the rights of people when their lives intersect with the digital sphere. This question remains under-regarded and a blog post tries to shed light on this grey area

The ICRC puts a special emphasis on the impact of misinformation and disinformation as they can increase people’s exposure to risk and vulnerabilities. For example, if displaced people in need of humanitarian assistance are given intentionally misleading information about life-saving services and resources, they can be misdirected away from help and towards harm.

Hate speech, meanwhile, contributes directly or indirectly to endangering civilian populations’ safety or dignity. For example, when online hate speech calls for violence against a minority group, it can contribute to psychological and social harm through harassment, defamation, and intimidation. 

These issues have been tackled in a document we published in 2021 called Harmful Information.

Misinformation and disinformation can also impact humanitarian organisations’ ability to operate in certain areas, potentially leaving the needs of people affected by armed conflict or other violence unmet. When false and manipulated information spreads, it can erode trust within communities and damage the reputation of humanitarian operations.

For the ICRC, whose work is founded on trust, the spread of disinformation, especially where tensions are high, could quickly lead to humanitarian personnel being unable to leave their offices, distribute live-saving assistance, visit detainees, or bring news to people who have lost contact with a family member.

Ultimately, it is important also to note that information operations have limits under IHL!

Outer space

Space systems have been employed for military purposes since the dawn of the space era. As the role of these systems in military operations during armed conflicts increases, so too does the likelihood of their being targeted, with a significant risk of harm to civilians and civilian objects on Earth and in space. This is because technology enabled by space systems permeates most aspects of civilian life, making the potential consequences of attacks on space systems a matter of humanitarian concern. Find out more in this blog called War, Law and Outer Space: Pathways to Reduce the Human Cost of Military Space Operations.

Privacy and data protection

The ICRC plays an active role in regard to privacy and data protection in the context of humanitarian action. It has a data protection framework compliant with international data protection standards that aims to protect individuals from a humanitarian standpoint. The framework consists of ICRC rules on personal data protection, which were revised in 2020 in response to the rapid development of digital technologies, while supervisory and control mechanisms are overseen by an independent data protection commission and a data protection officer.  In 2019, the ICRC spearheaded the adoption of a resolution on Restoring Family Links While Respecting Privacy, Including as it Relates to Personal Data Protection at the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent. In 2022, we pushed for the adoption of a resolution on Safeguarding Humanitarian Data at the Council of Delegates of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

Despite the wide range of data sources employed and dealt with by the ICRC, specific attention is dedicated to biometric data, which is often used in forensics and the restoration of family links. To manage this highly sensitive information and to ensure the responsible deployment of new technologies (including new biometric identification techniques), the ICRC has adopted a Biometrics Policy, which sets out the roles and responsibilities of the ICRC and defines the legitimate bases and specified purposes for the processing of biometric data. 

Data protection is also addressed by the ICRC Handbook on Data Protection in Humanitarian Action. The Handbook provides suggestions as to how current data protection principles apply to humanitarian organisations and builds on existing regulations, working procedures, and practices. The second edition specifically provides guidance on the technical aspects of data protection by design and by default and covers technological security measures. In addition, through dedicated chapters, it addresses the potential and risks of digital technology such as blockchain, AI, digital identity, and connectivity for data protection in humanitarian action.

The ICRC has argued in favour of the digitalisation of the Geneva Conventions and on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of these very treaties and additional protocols, released an IHL digital app. The app provides access to over 75 treaties including the Geneva Conventions, and allows users to read through the content and familiarise themselves with the text. The ICRC has a number of databases on IHL, including its customary IHL database and the ICRC national implementation database.  

Digital tools

Research and development

In 2022, the ICRC opened a Delegation for Cyberspace in Luxembourg, which serves as a safe and secure space to do due diligence research and develop and test solutions and ideas to prepare the ground for the support, protection, and deployment of digital services to affected people on a global scale. It will also further explore what it means to be a digital stakeholder in a manner compatible with its mandate; operational modalities; and the principles of neutrality, independence, and impartiality.

Resources

The ICRC’s Law and Policy blog provides a large number of short pieces on cyber operations, featuring tech expert, legal, and policy perspectives. 

Online learning is also used by the ICRC to promote the implementation of IHL. In 2019, we launched an e-learning course entitled Introduction to International Humanitarian Law aimed at non-legal practitioners, policymakers, and other professionals who are interested in the basics of IHL. Other online courses are available through the ICRC training centre as well as e-briefings which are available in the e-briefing library

The ICRC maintains an online training centre and an app with all ICRC publications in English and French. 

Social media channels

Facebook @ICRC

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LinkedIn @ICRC

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Geneva Centre for Security Policy

Acronym: GCSP

Address: Chemin Eugene-Rigot 2D, CH - 1211 Geneva 1, Switzerland

Website: https://gcsp.ch

The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) is an international foundation governed by a 54-member State Foundation Council serving a global community of individuals and organisations. Our mission is to advance peace, security, and international cooperation. We provide the knowledge, skills and network for 360° effective and inclusive decision-making.

The GCSP believes that effective and forward-thinking leaders and organisations need to build a broad picture of what is happening in an increasingly connected world. We unravel the intricacies of geopolitics and help leaders develop new skills and the agility to lead in times of tumultuous change. The GCSP creates an inclusive environment for their global community from 174 nations and across sectors who come together to exchange ideas and develop sustainable solutions for a more peaceful future. Building Peace Together through Education, Dialogue, Policy, Creativity and Community since 1995.

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Digital activities

The GCSP provides analysis that covers several digital topics, including cybersecurity and transformative technologies. Its executive education is offered online and in blended formats. In response to COVID-19, the GCSP launched a series of webinars titled Global Crisis, GlobalRisk and Global Consequences.

Digital policy issues

Artificial intelligence

As part of its Transformative Technologies cluster, the GCSP looks at AI and several ‘disruptive technologies’; the term refers to synthetic biology, neuro-morphic chips, big data, quantum computing, 3D and 4D printing, brain-computer interfaces, hypersonic technology, and cognitive enhancement. In particular, the GCSP focuses on the dual-use character of these technologies, their potential use in warfare and the future of warfare, and the existing legal provisions among warfare and humanitarian rules in relation to such technologies. Overall, activities as part of this cluster aim to alert policymakers to both the challenges and opportunities associated with these technologies. These aims are also reflected in associated educational activities, such as the course on Transformative Technologies and the Future of Geopolitics.

As part of its Global Risk and Resilience Cluster (GRRC), the GCSP has positioned itself as a thought leader on risks at the nexus of geopolitics and technology. To that purpose, it particularly monitors, analyses, and interprets the impact that emerging technologies such as AI, synthetic biology, neuroscience, quantum computing, and nanotechnologies will have on international politics, geopolitics, warfare, and conflicts. In addition to identifying emerging risks and future trends that will impact international security and warfare, the GRRC also promotes new responses that can be brought to deal with these emerging risks, notably through the concept of resilience.

Cybersecurity

The GCSP tackles cybersecurity issues through education and training activities, as well as policy analysis and events. It also provides a platform for dialogue and exchanges on cyber challenges among cyber experts from the public, private, and civil society sectors. The training and education activities cover areas such as cybersecurity strategy formulation, international law relating to cyber issues, cyber diplomacy, and broader capacity-building initiatives (e.g. workshops and student challenges). Policy papers published by the GCSP focus on the nature of cybersecurity, developing norms in the digital era, international legal analyses, and developing holistic solutions. The flagship course is Cyber Security in the Context of International Security; other bespoke courses cater to public and governmental staff and private and non-governmental employees. The  GCSP’s flagship annual cybersecurity event is the Cyber 9/12 Strategy Challenge. In partnership with the Atlantic Council, this strategy and policy competition pits over 200 students from around the world in a strategy and policy competition. Teams are judged by experts, high-level policymakers, thought leaders from industry and the public sector (including NATO and the EU), and government representatives. The challenge normally takes place at the GCSP headquarters in Geneva, but in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the 2022 competition took place entirely online.

Capacity development

Many of the GCSP’s activities fall into the category of capacity development activities. The GCSP offers courses and other educational and training programmes related to the internet and digital policy, such as cybersecurity, transformative technologies, and strategic foresight.

In addition to capacity building through its executive education programmes, the GCSP leverages its considerable intellectual and networking resources (i.e. its fellows and alumni) to engage with communities worldwide and foster trust between regions. The GCSP’s cybersecurity dialogues aim to remove barriers to communication and encourage the uptake of the opportunities today’s digital landscape has to offer.

In partnership with the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA), the GCSP convenes a Track 1.5 dialogue process to ensure there is as much communication as possible between parties who are often in conflict with one another. This process provides a platform and a mechanism for the exchange of ideas to build consensus on topics as diverse as international norms, agreement on legal paradigms, and regional socio-economic development.

Digital tools

Several other events organised by the GCSP also have a capacity development focus; one example is the annual Cyber 9/12 Strategy Challenge, a student competition in international cybersecurity strategy and policy. The challenge was held entirely online in 2022 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition, the publications produced by the organisation can help inform various stakeholders about the challenges and concerns in the area of cyber governance.

GCSP offers online courses, webinars, and an online dialogue series.

Social media channels

Facebook @thegcsp

Instagram @thegcsp

LinkedIn @thegcsp

Podcasts

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YouTube @Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)

Internet Governance Forum

Acronym: IGF

Established: 2006

Address: Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland

Website: https://www.intgovforum.org

Stakeholder group: International and regional organisations

The IGF provides the most comprehensive coverage of digital policy issues on the global level. The IGF Secretariat in Geneva coordinates both the planning of IGF annual meetings (working together with the Multistakeholder Advisory Group (MAG) and the wider IGF community) and a series of intersessional activities (run all year long). These activities could be summarised in three ‘multi’ initiatives:

  • Multistakeholder participation: It involves governments, business, civil society, the technical community, academia, and other actors who affect or are affected by digital policy This diversity is reflected in IGF processes, events, and consultations.
  • Multidisciplinary coverage: It relates to addressing policy issues from technological, legal, security, human rights, economic, development, and sociocultural perspectives. For example, data, as a governance issue, is addressed from standardisation, e-commerce, privacy, and security perspectives.
  • Multilevel approach: It spans IGF deliberations from the local level to the global level, through a network of over 165 national, subregional, and regional IGF (as of November 2023). They provide context for discussions on digital policy like the real-life impact of digitalisation on policy, economic, social, and cultural fabric of local communities. The IGF Secretariat supports such initiatives (which are independent) and coordinates the participation of the overall network.

The IGF ecosystem converges around the annual IGF, which is attended by thousands of participants. The last few IGFs include Paris (2018), Berlin (2019), online edition due to the pandemic (2020), Katowice (2021), Addis Ababa (2022), and Kyoto (2023), which engaged over 11,000 participants, and more than 1,000 speakers in over 300 sessions.

The intersessional work includes best practice forums (on issues such as cybersecurity, local content, data and new technologies, and gender and access); dynamic coalitions (on issues such as community connectivity, network neutrality, accessibility and disability, and child safety online etc.); policy networks (on AI, environment, meaningful access and Internet fragmentation); and other projects such as Policy Options for Connecting and Enabling the Next Billion(s) (which ran between 2015 and 2018) as well as a number of capacity development activities.

IGF mandate

The IGF mandate was outlined in the Tunis Agenda for the Information Society of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS, November 2005). It was renewed for another 10 years by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on 16 December 2015, (70/125).

The main functions of the IGF are specified in Article 72 of the Tunis Agenda. The mandate of the Forum is to:

  • Discuss public policy issues related to key elements of Internet governance in order to foster the sustainability, robustness, security, stability, and development of the internet.
  • Facilitate discourse between bodies dealing with different cross-cutting international public policies regarding the internet and discuss issues that do not fall within the scope of any existing body.
  • Interface with appropriate inter-governmental organisations and other institutions on matters under their purview.
  • Facilitate the exchange of information and best practices, and in this regard, make full use of the expertise of the academic, scientific, and technical communities.
  • Advise all stakeholders in proposing ways and means to accelerate the availability and affordability of the Internet in the developing world.
  • Strengthen and enhance the engagement of stakeholders in existing and/or future internet governance mechanisms, particularly those from developing countries.
  • Identify emerging issues, bring them to the attention of the relevant bodies and the general public, and where appropriate, make recommendations.
  • Contribute to capacity building for internet governance in developing countries, drawing on local sources of knowledge and expertise.
  • Promote and assess, on an ongoing basis, the embodiment of WSIS principles in internet governance processes.
  • Discuss, inter alia, issues relating to critical internet resources.
  • Help to find solutions to the issues arising from the use and misuse of the internet, of particular concern to everyday users.
  • Publish its proceedings.

In fulfilling its mandate, the Forum is institutionally supported by the UN Secretariat for the Internet Governance Forum placed with the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA). Its working modalities also include MAG and most recently the Leadership Panel, both appointed by the UN Secretary-General.

Digital policy issues

Until 2019, IGF annual meetings used to host sessions tackling a wide range of digital policy issues (for instance, IGF 2018 had eight themes: cybersecurity, trust, and privacy; development, innovation, and economic issues; digital inclusion and accessibility; human rights, gender, and youth; emerging technologies; evolution of internet governance; media and content; and technical and operational issues). In 2019, in an effort to bring more focus within the IGF, the MAG decided (considering community input) to structure the IGF programme around a limited number of tracks: security, safety, stability, and resilience; data governance; and digital inclusion. This approach was kept for IGF 2020, which saw four thematic tracks: data, environment, inclusion, and trust. The thematic approach did not mean that the IGF saw some digital policy issues as being less relevant than others, but rather that it encouraged discussions at the intersection of multiple issues. The Geneva Internet Platform (GIP) Digital Watch hybrid reporting (IGF 2023) illustrates this trend, showing that the IGF discussed a wide range of policy issues (across all seven internet governance baskets of issues) within the limited number of thematic tracks.

The leadership panel

In line with the IGF mandate and as recommended in the Secretary-General’s Roadmap for Digital Cooperation, the UN Secretary-General established the IGF Leadership Panel as a strategic, empowered, multistakeholder body, to address urgent, strategic issues, and highlight Forum discussions and possible follow-up actions to promote greater impact and dissemination of IGF discussions.

More specifically, the Panel provides strategic inputs and advice on the IGF; promotes the IGF and its outputs; supports both high-level and at-large stakeholder engagement in the IGF and IGF fundraising efforts; exchanges IGF outputs with other stakeholders and relevant forums; and feeds input from these decision-makers and forums to the IGF’s agenda-setting process, leveraging relevant MAG expertise.

The 15-member Panel with ex-officios meet at least three times a year in person, in addition to regular online meetings.

Future of meetings

Since its first meeting in Athens (2006), the IGF has been a pioneer in online deliberation and hybrid meetings. In addition to individual online participation, the IGF has encouraged the development of a network of remote hubs where participants meet locally while following online deliberations from the global IGF. In this way the IGF has created a unique interplay between local and global deliberations through the use of technology. For hybrid meetings delivered in situ and online, the IGF developed the function of remote moderator, who ensures that there is smooth interplay between online and in situ discussions.

The 19th annual IGF meeting will be hosted by the Government of Saudi Arabia in Riyadh in December 2024. The 2025 host is yet to be announced.

Social media channels

Facebook @IGF – Internet Governance Forum

Flickr @IGF

Instagram @intgovforum

LinkedIn @intgovforum

X @intgovforum

YouTube @Internet Governance Forum (IGF)

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